Wednesday, 15 March 2017

Battlefield Interdiction in the Indian scenario

Some Combat Perspective
The fantasy of deep penetration into enemy territory and bomb him into submission is nothing new but what is surprising is its continual prevalence in Air Forces around the world despite proving time and again that it does very little to influence the outcome of a conflict.It all started with the fascination for the the theories of strategic bombing framed by Giulio Douhet in his 1921 book, “The Command of the Air.”
The British , the Germans and the Americans employed deep penetration bombing extensively which did little to slow down the military infrastructure of their adversaries but strengthened the resolve of the public to support their respective countries in the war effort.The infrastructure destroyed was rebuilt within weeks but the number of aircraft and trained airmen lost in the bombing took months to regain,so is that in any sustainable? On the contrary Maj. Gen. Elwood Richard Quesada who organised the USAAF battlefield interdiction operations with the rugged and reliable P-47s during the Normandy operations proved to be extremely influential on the outcome of the battle.The P-47s had eight browning 0.50 cal machine guns which was incapable of penetrating the German tanks but played havoc with the soft skinned light vehicles,railway lines supplying and supporting the Panzer units and also damaging the running gear of the tanks which slowed down their progress.The result was that the German armoured units took several weeks instead of days to arrive at the battle and with a low moral too which proved to be decisive in the success of the allied forces in the battle.The economic cost imposed by these attacks were not significant but in the context of the battle and the time bought they proved critical.
       American fighters strafing trains, supply vehicles.
The vietnam conflict continue for a long time despite heavy deep strikes and the US suffered extensive losses to the Soviet style Integrated Air Defences with overlapping layers of AAA,SAMs and interceptors.The kosovo air campaign which started with few days of bombing in mind extended to 78 days with millions of tonnes of rdnance dropped , hundreds of missiles and precision munitions dropped with no significant losses on the adversary(post analysis by several agencies) or influence on the conflict. A capable trained adversary like the Serbian military could use deception, countermeasures, mobility,decoys to defeat sophisticated sensors and smart missiles.The level of awareness of the adversaries ground environment(except in the vicinity of combat or the FEBA where the "Fog of War" can take a toll on his awareness) is always higher than an intruding air force despite using the most sophisticated technology, it is an unfair game.
                                         Mig-29 decoy used by the Serbian Army to absorb PGBs, similar decoys  were also used for tanks.
The Indian Air Force Scenario
Now let us come to the Indian Scenario. The Indian Air Force over the years had judiciasly used air power to primarily attack the adversary in contact with our forces , his support elements, ammunition depots,artillery pieces etc. It has gone deep into enemy territory and attacked him only when it was a high value target(attack on airfields and runways) or when it was urgent(the attack on the East Pakistan Parliment) but gradually as the finacial resources and a wider choice of suppliers to choose from the mentality that the IAF can itself alone influence the course of a war had increased. It started of with the induction of the Sepecat Jaguar deep penetration attack aircraft which at that was looked at by many as an expensive acquisition.Now let us look at the scenarios in which the jaguar can be used in deep strikes,
1. Attacking airbases destroying/damaging aircraft and runways.
2.Attack command and control stations of the adversary.
3.Attacking other high value targets such as defence manufacturing plants, oil refineries,other infrastructure.
We will look at it case by case
1.Pakistan Air Force has been aware of this and has regularly carried out take offs and landing on highways in case air bases are crippled, a concept similar to the Swedish concept during the cold war where its fighters were based around freeways. Even in the case of attacking the airbases which are fairly large and distinct ,ballistic missiles and cruise missiles fired in barrages with a variety of bunker busting/sub munition warheads with satellites, HUMINT providing the coordinates might be cheaper and less risky.Off late ballistic missiles have become very accurate, come with a variety of warheads including sensor fused ones and they are cost effective to produce and use in numbers than expensive  trained pilots,imported fighters which will be diffciult to replace if lost
2. PAF and PLAAF are professional forces , they have a system of succession replacement and also can act in a decentralised manner with local commanders taking charge, so crippling the centralised command and control or neutralising a leader wont much good but on the contrary will turn a rigid centralised system into a flexible decentralised command structure. It will also be foolish on the part of PAF,PLAAF to believe that crippling the central command and control of Indian forces will affect Indian operations significantly.
3. Similar to attacking air bases, ballistic missiles can damage large stationary difficult to camouflage defence infrastructure cost effectively with minimised risk.

Thus the recent acquisitions of the SU-30MKI,Rafale and upgradation of Jaguars for billions of dollars, if used for striking deep into the adversary would not affect the outcome of the conflict much and if the losses on our side are high which probably will be the case considering the formidable air defences of Pakistan and China it will counterproductive for our war efforts. As far as the air component of the nuclear triad ,it doesn't offer any advantages over a sea based or a land based nuclear deterrent and is superfluous considering that the limitation in size of the air launched nuclear warhead which would probably be used as a tactical nuclear device itself is a oxymoron as nuclear delivery can never be tactical and will quickly escalate. The belief that a deterrent system is incomplete if there is no air component is incorrect.
One possible alternative would be to develop and produce locally an affordable,light, survivable battlefield interdiction aircraft and a close air support aircraft which can be produced in numbers within existing technology, infrastructure and  budget limitations. They can support our mobile battle groups as a part of our cold start doctrine, produce a good number of quality pilots by providing cheaper flying hours and can be easily replaceable if lost.


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